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INTRODUCTION
The occasion of Chief Justice Ronald D. Castille's retirement from
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court1 is a fitting one to assess his state
constitutional legacy. The major aspect of that legacy is the impact
the Chief Justice has had in changing the way that the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution is interpreted, along with the resulting likelihood
that Pennsylvania jurisprudence will follow federal constitutional
interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions. 2 This is espe-
cially so in the realm of search and seizure. That is why the title of
this evaluation mentions Commonwealth v. Edmunds,3 a search
case that, in 1991, outlined for the first time in Pennsylvania his-
tory, a methodology for the interpretation of parallel rights. The
Chief Justice has changed the way that Edmunds is used by the
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. My thanks to Paul Kush and
Brook Dirlam, my research assistants, who ably assisted in the preparation of this article
and the CLE program upon which it is based. Full disclosure requires that I note to the
reader that Chief Justice Castille and I have enjoyed a publically contentious relationship.
But I don't believe that has influenced this writing. In the words of Tevye from Fiddler on
the Roof, "that's all settled... [n]ow we live in simple peace and harmony." Of course, I still
maintain "[i]t was a horse."
1. Chief Justice Castille retired on December 31, 2014, pursuant to the operation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution's mandatory judicial retirement provision, article V, section 16(b).
2. Twenty years ago, I resisted the term "parallel" to describe rights contained in both
a state and the Federal Constitution and applicable to actions by state and local officials. I
suggested the phrase, "potentially applicable state constitutional provisions," instead. Bruce
Ledewitz, The Role of Lower State Courts in Adapting State Law to Changed Federal Inter-
pretations, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1994). Needless to say, this innovation did not catch
on, though it still has the merit of emphasizing the equality of state and federal constitutions
in protecting individual liberty.
3. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
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Pennsylvania judiciary, thus changing the meaning of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution far into the future.
But the title of this article-Beyond Edmunds-also suggests
that this simple narrative is not the whole story of the impact of the
Chief Justice on the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is not even the
whole story of his impact on Edmunds. All of the different aspects
of the Chief Justice's state constitutional decision-making must be
looked at before his legacy can be fairly evaluated. That is what I
propose to do, briefly, here. The analysis will not be exhaustive, but
I hope I can hit the high points.
Every state supreme court justice in America confronts state con-
stitutional issues in three domains: (1) separation of powers, for
which federal precedents are merely suggestive; (2) interpretive is-
sues involving parallel rights, in which federal constitutional law
may be treated as determinative, but need not be; and (3) non-par-
allel rights, in which federal precedent will usually be lacking. It is
in the second category that Edmunds issues arise.
Over the course of his over twenty years on the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, Chief Justice Castille has left a mark in all three ar-
eas. But, certainly his least noted impact has been in the field of
the separation of powers. There, the Chief Justice has been un-
derappreciated. That is where I will begin.
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
While unheralded, probably the most important decision ren-
dered by Chief Justice Castille in his entire judicial career is his
opinion for a unanimous court in Pennsylvania State Association of
County Commissioners v. Commonwealth (PSACCI1),4 which ap-
pears to have finally ended the decades-long constitutional crisis
over court funding in Pennsylvania. The background of the crisis
goes back to 1985, when Allegheny County filed suit against the
Commonwealth for a declaratory judgment directing the Common-
wealth to directly fund the operating costs of all of the local courts,
including the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Alle-
gheny County 1).5 Allegheny County was relying on language in ar-
ticle V, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution vesting the "ju-
dicial power of the Commonwealth in a unified judicial system ...
."6 At the time of the litigation, the Commonwealth directly funded
4. 52 A.3d 1213 (Pa. 2012).
5. Allegheny Cnty. v. Commonwealth (Allegheny County 1), 500 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Cmmw.
Ct. 1985).
6. Id. at 1268.
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some of the costs of local courts and required that counties pay the
remainder of the costs-that cost amounted to millions of dollars
that had to come from county budgets. 7
The Commonwealth Court dismissed the action, which had been
filed under that court's original jurisdiction, on the ground that the
case was not justiciable.8 The court noted both the absence of any
"concrete" indication in the Pennsylvania Constitution as to the re-
quirement of centralized court funding and the questionable "power
to fashion a judicial remedy . .."
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and en-
tered judgment for Allegheny County (Allegheny County J1).10 Tell-
ingly, all four votes in the majority came from Justices residing in
Allegheny County: Justice John Flaherty wrote the majority opin-
ion, joined by Justices Rolf Larsen, Stephen Zappala, and Nicholas
Papadakos. Chief Justice Robert Nix wrote a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justice James McDermott.11 Following the decision, the
Governor and the General Assembly filed applications to intervene,
but an equally divided court denied these. 12
The mandated change in court funding was never carried out. At
the time of its decision, the court stayed its mandate in order to give
the General Assembly time to enact a new funding scheme. 13 But
no such legislation was passed. Presumably, the main reason for
legislative inaction was the sheer size of the sums involved and the
new taxes that would be required to fulfill the court's order. But in
addition, the weak justification for such an enormous result and the
politicized context of the vote on the court, doubtless also contrib-
uted to the lack of legislative response.
Whatever the reason, the inability of the court to enforce its judg-
ment soon became a "public embarrassment for the court. '14 Five
efforts to enforce the court's mandate failed in the years that fol-
lowed. The year after the decision, in 1988, Philadelphia County
tried to force the court's hand by dropping funding for its court of
7. In dissent, Chief Justice Nix estimated that the General Assembly would have to
come up with an additional $239,000,000 for local court funding to comply with the court's
mandate to take over all court funding in Pennsylvania. Allegheny Cty. v. Commonwealth
(Allegheny County I1), 534 A.2d 760, 768 n.3 (Pa. 1987) (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
8. Allegheny County , 500 A.2d at 1270-71.
9. Id.
10. Allegheny County II, 534 A.2d at 765.
11. Id. (Justice Hutchinson did not participate in the decision of the case).
12. Id. at 768. Justice Papadakos joined the two dissenters in favor of granting inter-
vention and hearing re-argument.
13. Id. at 765.
14. Bruce Ledewitz, What's Really Wrong With the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 32
DUQ. L. REV. 409, 427 (1994).
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common pleas, which led to a per curiam order by the court to Phil-
adelphia County to fund the local courts.15 The next year, a request
for mandamus to enforce the court's mandate was denied by a per
curiam order. 16 In 1991, Allegheny County filed a motion to lift the
stay and enforce the judgment, and in 1992, the Pennsylvania State
Association of County Commissioners filed a motion to enforce the
judgment. Both motions were denied.1 7 In late 1992, another at-
tempt to enforce the judgment was made, this time seeking resto-
ration of funding. In a majority opinion, Justice Flaherty denied
relief, pointing out that the original case had had nothing to do with
funding levels per se (Allegheny County 111).18
Frustration with this course of events was manifested in Alle-
gheny County III in a dissent by Chief Justice Nix reiterating the
argument of his original dissent in 1987 that the funding order was
"unenforceable" and a dissent by Justice Larsen, who had joined the
original majority, stating that failure to enforce the judgment
"leaves this Court's proclamation of law ... perpetually unenforce-
able and thus a mere abstraction."1 9
In the next round of the litigation, the stakes rose considerably.
In 1996, the court finally granted mandamus relief.20 The issuance
of the per curiam order, which appointed former Justice Frank
Montemuro, Jr. as master to prepare an interim report containing
recommendations to implement a unified judicial system, was a
very close thing. The vote in favor was only 4-2, in which Justice
Sandra Schultz Newman expressed considerable reluctance in join-
ing the majority. 21 Then-Justice Castille both joined a dissent by
Chief Justice Nix22 and authored his own dissent,23 which the Chief
Justice joined.
The Interim Report was issued on July 30, 1997, after what Chief
Justice Castille would later describe as "the culmination of remark-
15. Bradley v. Casey, 682 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1988).
16. Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 89 E.D. Misc. 1989 (order dated March 31, 1989).
17. Pa. State Ass'n of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Commonwealth (PSACC 1), 681 A.2d 699, 703
n.3 (Pa. 1996).
18. Cnty, of Allegheny v. Commonwealth (Allegheny County I1), 626 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa.
1993).
19. Id. (Nix, C.J., & Larsen, J., dissenting).
20. PSACCI, 681 A.2d at 703.
21. In concurrence, Justice Newman expressed her reservations with joining the major-
ity opinion, but recognized that the rule of stare decisis required that the holding of Allegheny
County H1be applied to the case before them. Id. at 706 (Newman, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 707 (Nix, CA., dissenting).
23. Id. at 707-10 (Castille, J., dissenting).
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able, and surely unprecedented, inter-branch participation and co-
operation. '24 The Report noted some genuine system-wide cooper-
ation and consolidation, but left the issue of statewide funding, the
genesis of the original litigation, to the future. The court did not
formally adopt or reject the Interim Report.
In the final step of the litigation leading to the end of the court-
funding constitutional impasse, a motion was filed in 2008 to com-
pel the General Assembly to implement the recommendations con-
tained in the Report. Chief Justice Castille's unanimous opinion in
PSACC II held that the court would neither grant further relief nor
overrule the court's original holding in Allegheny County I. 25 The
opinion struck a pragmatic and conciliatory tone:
We are optimistic that recent progress on budgetary questions
will continue; indeed, the General Assembly's arguments in
this case confirm that it will; and we are encouraged that the
changes implemented as a result of the 1997 Interim Report
have served as a foundation for further evolution toward a bet-
ter, administratively unified judicial system.26
With these simple words, a constitutional crisis that had festered
for over thirty-five years finally came to an end. The Chief Justice
had earlier indicated, in PSACC , that he was unpersuaded by the
Court's rationale in Allegheny County 11,27 but he spared the court
any further institutional damage by not returning to that issue.
Similarly, the Chief Justice clearly sought to mend fences with the
legislature by not pointing to the General Assembly's consistent re-
fusal to obey the court's mandate, but emphasizing instead the de-
gree of interbranch cooperation that had been shown in streamlin-
ing the state courts. 28 It was judicial statesmanship by a Chief Jus-
tice able to bring the entire court along with him.
In general terms, Chief Justice Castille did not manifest an over-
all theory of the separation-of-powers, in the same sense that he did
not have a general jurisprudential orientation. State court judges
usually do not approach their work in that way. But it is fair to say
that the Chief Justice took the notion of the independence of the
branches of government, and of the prerogatives of each branch, se-
riously. This was most obviously so with regard to the prerogatives
24. PSACC II, 52 A.3d at 1224.
25. Id. at 1233.
26. Id.
27. PSACCI, 681 A.2d at 709.
28. PSACC II, 52 A.3d at 1229.
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of the judicial branch.29 But, outside of clashes between the court
and the legislature, the Chief Justice was also supportive of the in-
dependent powers of the General Assembly. The way that the Chief
Justice resolved the court-funding crisis illustrates both points, but
so do a loose collection of otherwise unrelated cases that I will men-
tion here briefly.
The deference that Chief Justice Castille gave to the legislature
in its own realm was manifested in his approach to the single sub-
ject rule and to the power of the legislature over municipal govern-
ments in Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment30 in 2009. Chief
Justice Castille's majority opinion held both that an amendment to
the First Class City Home Act (Act) controlled the issue of taxpayer
standing to challenge local zoning decisions rather than a local or-
dinance-standing in such cases is not a matter of "purely local con-
cern"31-and that the amendment did not violate the article III, sec-
tion 3 requirement that "[n]o bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject .... -32
Although decisions in these fields are fact specific, the effect of
Spahn was to modestly enhance the flexibility and authority of the
General Assembly. The Chief Justice held that the broad subject of
civil remedies sufficiently united the various provisions in the bill. 33
That it had been the intention of the Chief Justice to legitimate
that broad topic under the single subject rule, and thus to enhance
legislative flexibility, became clear in a 2013 decision that found a
violation of the rule: Commonwealth v. Neiman.34 The court held
that an Act governing deficiency judgments and county park police
jurisdiction, to which a wide variety of civil and criminal provisions
were added, violated article III, section 3. Chief Justice Castille
filed the lone dissent, in which he admitted that the single subject
rule issue was close. But he wrote that he would have upheld the
Act as one "refining civil remedies," which the rest of the court de-
nied could constitute a single category for purposes of the rule. 35
The Chief Justice emphasized the "highly deferential nature of our
review," quoting the language of presumptive constitutionality that
29. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 641 (Pa. 2014) (holding that when orders of the Court of
Judicial Discipline and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court conflict, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court controls judicial discipline under its King's Bench power).
30. 977 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 2009).
31. Id. at 1144-45.
32. PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
33. Id. at 1148.
34. 84 A.3d 603, 616 (Pa. 2013) (Castille, C.J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 619.
376 Vol. 53
Summer 2015 Beyond Edmunds
is ritually invoked in nearly all cases passing on the constitutional-
ity of statutes. 36 Thus, the Chief Justice signaled a general defer-
ence to the legislature when the General Assembly was engaged in
its core constitutional function of legislating.37
In terms of the independent powers of the judiciary, the Chief
Justice wrote two opinions in highly controversial cases: one of the
two opinions in support of affirmance in Gmerek v. State Ethics
Commission38 in 2002 and the majority opinion in Stilp v. Common-
wealth,39 the 2006 pay raise case. Gmerek affirmed, by an equally
divided court, the holding by the en banc Commonwealth Court 40
that the Lobbying Disclosure Act was unconstitutional. Stilp up-
held both a pay raise and its repeal, but excluded from the repeal
any additional monies that had been granted to judges prior to the
repeal.
In Gmerek, the three votes in favor of affirming the judgment of
the Commonwealth Court could not agree on rationale. For Chief
Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Cappy, the case was a fairly
straightforward application of the "well established," "exclusive ju-
risdiction" of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "over the conduct of
attorneys."41 Legislative regulation of lobbying, when engaged in
by attorneys, is regulation of attorneys and is therefore unconstitu-
tional.
36. Id. at 616.
37. Although he did not write the dissent, but only joined it, Justice Saylor's dissent in
Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc., u. Pike Cty Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 44 A.3d 3, 9 (Pa.
2012), is an excellent example of Chief Justice Castille's tendency to defer to the legislature.
The court held that satisfaction of statutory charity criteria is not enough to gain a tax ex-
emption-an applicant must satisfy the court's judicially created test defining a "purely pub-
lic charity." In contrast, the dissent would have reassessed that judicial test in light of the
legislature's enacted policy.
Of course, such deference cannot be absolute, which is why it is so difficult to discuss
general themes in attempting to assess Chief Justice Castille's approach to the separation of
powers. Thus, the Chief Justice recently joined the rest of the court in finding the Act per-
mitting elimination ofjury commissioners unconstitutional as a violation of the single subject
rule. Pa. State Assoc. of Jury Commrs. v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611 (Pa. 2013).
It should also be remembered that sometimes separation of powers issues involve
disputes between the Executive and Legislative branches, in which case the model of defer-
ence cannot really be applied. See, for example, Chief Justice Castille's opinion for a unani-
mous court in Jubelirer u. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514 (Pa. 2008), in which the court held that
article IV, section 16 does not permit the Governor to veto language defining a specific ap-
propriation unless the Governor vetoes the funding itself. Jubelirer is also important in that
the Chief Justice's opinion held that application of the four-factor Edmunds analysis was not
required because the state constitutional provision at issue did not have a federal counter-
part.
38. 807 A.2d 812 (Pa. 2002).
39. 905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006).
40. 751 A.2d 1241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
41. Gmerek, 807 A.2d at 817.
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Then-Justice Castille did not disagree with this position in his
separate opinion in support of affirmance, but the sweeping nature
of Justice Zappala's opinion prevented him from joining it:
Although the points cogently made in Mr. Justice Saylor's
Opinion in Support of Reversal have given me pause, I never-
theless find myself, after considered review, in a posture of af-
firmance. Because I have reached this conclusion for what I
believe are reasons somewhat narrower than those expressed
by Mr. Chief Justice Zappala in his Opinion in Support of Af-
firmance, I write separately. 42
Justice Castille stated expressly that much of the act was consti-
tutional in his view, even as applied to lobbyists who were attor-
neys.43
In Stilp, the difficult issues in the case concerned whether the
original pay raise had itself been unconstitutional, whether directly
or through nonseverability. 44 Once it was determined that the pay
raise had been constitutional, Justice Castille treated the pay raise
as immediately effective. Therefore, article V, section 16(a) did not
allow the judicial portion of the pay raise to be repealed. 45
Justice Castille has been a consistent supporter of the preroga-
tives of the judicial branch in less controversial contexts as well.
One such context was standing and jurisdiction in Housing Author-
ity of County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commis-
sion.46 In that case, the commission ordered the Housing Authority
to offer a position to a qualified veteran and the Housing Authority
appealed the order on the ground, inter alia, that the commission
lacked standing to enforce the Military Affairs Act on its own initi-
ative. Justice Castille held, in a lead opinion that was not a major-
ity opinion on this point,47 that, while the commission would lack
standing under the federal constitutional doctrine of cases and con-
troversies, the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
not constitutionally limited in the same way as is that of the Article
III courts. The Pennsylvania Constitution allows jurisdiction "as
42. Id. at 820.
43. The Act itself provided, in Section 1311(b), that if portions of the Act were declared
invalid, the entire act was to be declared invalid.
44. 905 A.2d at 949, 981.
45. "Justices['] ... compensation shall not be diminished during their terms of office,
unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST.
art. V, § 16(a).
46. 730 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1999).
47. Justice Saylor, the fourth vote, did not concur in this part of Justice Castille's opinion.
Id. at 950 (Saylor, J., concurring).
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shall be provided by law . ... ",48 Justice Castille repeated in a foot-
note an earlier holding by the court that the "powers" of the court
go even further, to include all powers vested in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court at the time the 1968 Constitution was adopted. 49
This was dictum, but demonstrates the consistent determination of
the Chief Justice throughout his career to defend the authority of
the court.
Another example of the defense of the prerogatives of the courts
is his opinion for a unanimous court in In re Buchanan,50 holding
that an autopsy report could be sealed by a court if the Common-
wealth established that release of the report threatened to hinder
the investigation of a homicide. The separation of powers issue
arose because the Coroner's Act provides that autopsy reports must
be released within thirty days after the end of the year. 51 A majority
of the Pennsylvania Superior Court panel held that courts retain
an inherent authority to seal an autopsy report upon a showing of
necessity. 52 That result was affirmed. 53 But, as in Gmerek above,
Justice Castille wrote a narrow opinion, holding only that the Cor-
oner's Act was aimed by its terms at the authority of coroners rather
than the traditional and inherent powers of the courts to seal cer-
tain sensitive information for temporary periods. The opinion care-
fully noted that the court was in fact "bound" by the "plain terms"
of the Coroner's Act. 54
Buchanan illustrates the tendency of the Chief Justice to try to
avoid direct confrontations between the authority of the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court and the courts generally, on the one hand, and
the authority of the legislature on the other, and, where that has
not been possible, to narrow or soften the conflict. In Common-
wealth v. Mockaitis,55 however, neither avoidance nor softening was
possible and Justice Castille, not surprisingly, held for a unanimous
court that it was a violation of the separation of powers for a sen-
tencing court to be given "executive functions" by statute. In
Mockaitis, sentencing judges in certain DUI cases were given the
responsibility to order installation of an approved ignition interlock
device, transmit a record of that order to the Department of Trans-
48. PA. CONST. art. V, § 4.
49. Housing Auth., 730 A.2d at 941 n.13.
50. 880 A.2d 568 (Pa. 2005).
51. 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1251 (West 2015).
52. In re Buchanan, 823 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
53. In re Buchanan, 880 A.2d 568, 559 (Pa. 2005).
54. Id. at 576.
55. 834 A.2d 488 (Pa. 2003).
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portation as a condition precedent to license restoration, and to cer-
tify to the department that the offender has complied. 56 All of this,
Justice Castille held, forced courts to serve the functions of the de-
partment in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 57
Finally, Chief Justice Castille has attempted to protect the judi-
cial branch as an institution even in dire circumstances. In In re
Interbranch Commission on Juvenile Justice,58 Chief Justice Cas-
tille wrote a majority opinion ordering the Judicial Conduct Board
to disclose certain information and documents under seal to the In-
terbranch Commission on Juvenile Justice, which was investigat-
ing the judicial scandal involving a juvenile justice in Luzerne
County. 59 In a portion of his opinion that was not joined by a ma-
jority of the court, the Chief Justice responded to the argument in
Justice Joan Orie Melvin's concurring and dissenting opinion that
the information at issue should not only be disclosed to the Inter-
branch Commission on Juvenile Justice (ICJJ), but should in effect
be made public. The closing words of the Chief Justice's opinion
express not only his disappointment with the judicial misconduct
underlying the case, but his care to uphold constitutional strictures
even when unpopular, in order to maintain the independence and
authority of the judicial branch. These words are a fitting summary
of the Chief Justice's overall approach to the separation of powers
throughout his career on the bench:
The situation in Luzerne County is shocking and disappointing
beyond words; the various interventions of this Court, and the
very existence of an Interbranch entity such as the ICJJ alone
are testament to that fact. The public and political debate, of
course, may encompass all voices, responsible and irresponsi-
ble, learned and reckless, and citizens in that debate are enti-
tled to voice their opinions giving scant or no attention to salu-
tary restrictions existing in the law, where foundational com-
mands and precedent must hold sway. Our task is different
from that of the litigant, the politician, or the editorialist, and
56. Id. at 490-91.
57. Even in Mockaitis, Justice Castille narrowed the conflict. The opinion went on to
explain, under a severability analysis, how the ignition lock requirement could continue to
function. Id. at 502-03.
58. 988 A.2d 1269 (Pa. 2010).
59. The Commission was created by statute in 2009 "to investigate circumstances that
led to corruption in the juvenile court of Luzerne County resulting in federal criminal charges
against two judges, to restore public confidence in the administration ofjustice and to prevent
similar events from occurring there or elsewhere in the Commonwealth." INTERBRANCH
COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/archived-re-
sources/interbranch-commission-on-juvenile-justice (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
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it is inevitably less understood and often less popular. Our
sworn task is to apply the law; and in so doing we cannot ig-
nore, rewrite or torture settled language and propositions, and
then apply that construct retroactively without affording the
parties an opportunity to be heard, in order to reach a per-
ceived favored conclusion, no matter how extreme the circum-
stance that brings a dispute to our attention.60
11. INTERPRETATION OF PARALLEL PROVISIONS OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
Undoubtedly, the aspect of Chief Justice Castille's state constitu-
tional legacy that attorneys and students of the constitution will
most remember is his role in reinterpreting the methodology by
which parallel provisions of the State Constitution are inter-
preted-in other words, his reinterpretation of Commonwealth v.
Edmunds.6 1
The story of Edmunds begins, as the entire field we know today
as state constitutional law begins, in 1969, with the end of the War-
ren Court and the beginning of the Burger Court. The history of the
United States Supreme Court in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries can be understood as a continuing conserva-
tive reaction against the methods and substantive decisions of the
Warren Court. Since the end of the Warren Court in 1969, Ameri-
can liberalism has lacked a consistent jurisprudential vision. That
consistent vision, both in terms of constitutional methods-such as
textualism and originalism-and outcomes-the recognition of the
constitutional rights of corporations, for example-has come from a
series of conservative Courts: the Burger, Rehnquist, and now the
Robert's Courts. Meanwhile, liberals on the United States Supreme
Court could sometimes win judicial victories-Roe v. Wade62 in
1973, for example-but only as isolated, interest group decisions
rather than elements of an overall approach to constitutional gov-
ernment.
At the change point, in 1969, there were still many Warren Court
liberals serving as judges in the lower state courts, and serving as
justices on state supreme courts. They were by no means done with
expanding constitutional rights for Americans. But there was no
real tradition at that time of state court liberal activism. The War-
60. Interbranch Commn., 988 A.2d at 1283.
61. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
62. 410 U.S. 113.
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ren Court revolutions in criminal procedure, civil rights, civil pro-
cedure and what came to be known as privacy had no parallel in the
state courts. Indeed, some of the Warren Court innovations came
about because of the failures of state courts to enforce their own
state constitutions, as was glaringly the case in the reapportion-
ment cases.
63
All this began to change in 1969 as the Warren Court came to an
end and state courts began to articulate their own vision of a liberal
jurisprudence. But the change did not gain national momentum
until U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan published a law
review article, which appeared in 1977 in the Harvard Law Re-
view-State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights.6 4
Justice Brennan in effect called upon state judges to continue the
Warren Court revolutions under the authority of state constitu-
tional law.
To understand Justice Brennan's call, one must remember that
in interpreting parallel constitutional rights, that is, rights in state
constitutions that parallel rights in the Federal Constitution, state
judges are bound to apply federal constitutional jurisprudence by
the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution and by the
doctrine of incorporation. Thus, a search that is unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment, is unconstitutional whether perpe-
trated by the FBI or by the state police, and will lead to the same
suppression of evidence in federal court or in state court.
But, while state judges must always enforce federal rights, they
are also free to go beyond them. So, for example, a criminal defend-
ant who has no right to counsel under the Federal Sixth Amend-
ment might have a right to counsel under a parallel state constitu-
tional right.
Expansions of rights under state constitutions were considered a
politically liberal result because, during this period, almost all ex-
pansions of constitutional rights worked in favor of criminal defend-
ants, unpopular groups and poor people. Today, in contrast, expan-
sions of constitutional rights, while still often protecting such
63. Stemming from Tennessee's legislative failure to reapportion the legislative districts
based upon changes in population, as was provided in the State's Constitution, the Supreme
Court held in Baker u. Carr that the complaint's allegations of a denial of Equal Protection
presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Similarly, in
Reynolds u. Sims, the Supreme Court held that the existing and proposed plans for appor-
tionment of seats in the two houses of the Alabama Legislature were invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause in that the apportionment was not on a population basis and was com-
pletely lacking in rationality. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
64. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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groups, might also be promoted by gun owners and corporations.
So, today, expansive state constitutional interpretation is not one-
sidedly a liberal or conservative proposition.
State judges responded to Justice Brennan's call to a great ex-
tent. And this was true in Pennsylvania as well. Thus, the late
1970s and 1980s were a period of judicial innovation in the Penn-
sylvania courts, particularly in the field of search and seizure. This
was the era of Commonwealth v. DeJohn,6 5 which, in 1979, rejected
United States v. Miller, and recognized an expectation of privacy in
a person's individual bank records; Commonwealth v. Sell,6 6 which,
in 1983, rejected United States v. Salvucci, and upheld automatic
standing to challenge a search in a possession crime; and Common-
wealth v. Melilli,6 7 which in 1989, rejected Smith v. Maryland, and
held that a pen register constitutes a search. There were other
cases, of course, and sometimes they followed federal law and some-
times they did not. It was all rather unpredictable and freewheel-
ing.
The conservative reaction to this judicial activity began, both in
Pennsylvania and across the country, almost as soon as Justice
Brennan's article appeared. In a 1981 article in Hastings Constitu-
tional Law Quarterly, a noted conservative law professor, Ronald
Collins, called the approach that Justice Brennan was proposing
"reactionary"-Reliance on State Constitutions--Away from a Reac-
tionary Approach.68 The way that the conservative theory mani-
fested was in a "presumption" that state courts should follow the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting parallel federal
provisions unless there was some special reason not to do so under
state law. Here is how Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Wil-
liam Hutchinson phrased this conservative criticism in his dissent
in Sell:
[T]he majority has not shown, nor can I discern a textual dis-
tinction between [a]rticle I, [s]ection 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution which would justify the significant difference in
meaning between them which the majority opinion entails...
65. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting U.S. v Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976)).
66. Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983) (rejecting U.S. u. Salvucci, 48 U.S.
83 (1983)).
67. Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1989) (rejecting Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
68. Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Ap-
proach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981).
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absent compelling reasons, textual or otherwise, I believe the
interests of this nation are best served by maintaining common
standards of constitutional law throughout its separate juris-
dictions.69
The basic argument of the conservative reaction was that this
new, liberal state constitutional jurisprudence was entirely out-
come oriented. It had no method and no vision. Essentially, state
judges were just disagreeing with the new, more conservative, U.S.
Supreme Court.
This reaction raised a serious jurisprudential question. Was it
illegitimate for a state court judge, in interpreting a parallel but
independent state constitutional provision, to simply disagree with
the outcome of a similar question under federal law? Did there have
to be some special reason for a state court to depart from the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation?
The Edmunds case arose out of this rich context. Prior to Ed-
munds, there had been no authoritative method for generally deter-
mining whether Pennsylvania would follow federal precedent in in-
terpreting parallel rights. But, as suggested by Commonwealth v.
Gray,70 in 1985, a kind of mild presumption of following federal law
was perhaps beginning to emerge. In Gray, Justice Hutchinson's
majority opinion rejected further reliance on the Aguilar-Spinelli
test for judging probable cause and adopted the new federal stand-
ard of the "totality of the circumstances" enunciated by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Illinois v. Gates.7 1 Justice Hutchison's opinion
mixed language agreeing with the federal analysis, independently
as it were, with the language of presumption:
While we can interpret our own constitution to afford defend-
ants greater protections than the federal constitution does,
there should be a compelling reason to do so. In Chandler, su-
pra, we already noted that the Gates analysis appears more
practical. That this is so is even more plain on this record. Be-
sides, there is no substantial textual difference between the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
[a]rticle I, [s]ection 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that
69. Sell, 470 A.2d at 470 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
70. 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985).
71. Id. at 922 (adopting the federal standard for judging probable cause as stated in Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
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would require us to expand the protections afforded under the
federal document. 72
After Gray, a lower court state court judge in Pennsylvania would
have been justified in either evaluating a federal approach inde-
pendently or following it in the absence of some special local consid-
eration.
In Edmunds, in 1991, in a majority opinion by Justice Ralph
Cappy, the court not only rejected the federal good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule, which the U.S. Supreme Court had
adopted in United States v. Leon 73 in 1984, but also formally
adopted four factors for analysis of Pennsylvania constitutional pro-
visions. The four factors require considering the text, history, hold-
ings in other states, and "policy considerations, including unique
issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern
Pennsylvania jurisprudence."74
Edmunds contained no presumption that state constitutional in-
terpretation would follow interpretations by the U.S. Supreme
Court, nor did it limit its consideration to unique issues of Pennsyl-
vania policy. So, for example, the final "policy consideration" that
Justice Cappy mentioned was "the danger[] of allowing magistrates
to serve as 'rubber stamps' and of fostering 'magistrate-shopping,"'
-concerns clearly not unique to Pennsylvania. 75
The lack of a presumption of following federal constitutional in-
terpretation was understood by Justice James McDermott in his
dissent in Edmunds. Justice McDermott wrote: "The Supreme
Court of the United States is a world landmark for the protection of
constitutional rights. What they require we enforce; what they al-
low we ought not deter except upon clear evidence of positive
need."76
But, despite lacking a presumption, Edmunds certainly permit-
ted the Pennsylvania courts to follow federal precedent under the
four factors. During the rest of the 1990s, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court tended to do just that, becoming more conservative,
less likely to expand constitutional rights under the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Chief Justice Castille joined the court in 1993 and
was part of that trend. From the start of his career on the court,
72. Id. at 926.
73. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
74. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991).
75. Id. at 904.
76. Id. at 909 (McDermott, J., dissenting).
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Justice Castille used the Edmunds factors to show that there was
no justification in most cases for not following federal precedent. 77
But it was in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Shaw, 78 in 2001,
that Justice Castille first expressed the view that Edmunds analy-
sis might generally lead the court to adopt federal precedent-that
the case's methodology might appropriately limit idiosyncratic in-
terpretations of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In Shaw, the court
held, in a majority opinion by Justice Stephen Zappala, that a war-
rant is required for seizure of hospital-administered blood-alcohol
content test results under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.7 9 Justice Castille, joined by Justice Thomas Saylor,
objected both to the outcome of the case and to what he considered
the lack of a proper method by the majority:
I am particularly wary of novel expansions of [a]rticle I, [s]ec-
tion 8 that are unaccompanied by an Edmunds analysis. A
novel and unexplained holding under [a]rticle I, [s]ection 8 is a
practice that permits a jurisprudence of contrariness or, even
worse, arbitrariness. Such an unexplained holding is at least
as likely to be a mere expression of a Court majority's personal
disagreement with contrary Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, dressed in state constitutional garb in order to avoid cor-
rection by the United States Supreme Court, as it is to be an
affirmative expression of what the state provision uniquely
means it embraces. By previously requiring that novel state
constitutional claims be considered in light of our actual expe-
rience with [a]rticle I, [s]ection 8 and with the experience of
this court and other courts with similar search and seizure
questions, and with policy concerns "unique" to our jurispru-
dence, the Edmunds construct at least provides some sem-
blance of a principled constitutional analysis of a particular is-
sue. The inability to even begin to defend a novel holding pur-
suant to Edmunds, on the other hand, betrays a total disregard
for the experience of other courts as well as for this Court's own
77. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031 (Pa. 1997) (holding that the
Pennsylvania Constitution provided parolee with no greater protection than United States
Constitution with regard to search of his bedroom); Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655
(Pa. 2000) (acknowledging that the standard for evaluating probable cause is the same under
the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution and holding that antici-
patory search warrants, i.e., warrants based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that
at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified
place, do not per se violate search and seizure provision of the State Constitution).




considered experience and, in my view, raises a presumption
that the state constitutional holding is erroneous.80
This view of Edmunds was at least arguably a reinterpretation
of that case. Specifically, the policy factors in the fourth prong in
Edmunds crucially utilized the word "including" in describing
"unique issues of state and local concern." And, in Edmunds itself,
the simple disagreement with the outcome of Federal Fourth
Amendment analysis was treated as a proper basis for a different
result under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Assuming that the
Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant in circumstances like
those in Shaw-there was not actually controlling U.S. Supreme
Court precedent either way-a state supreme court justice might
just feel that the privacy interests at stake had been given too little
weight. While it is true that interpretations of article I, section 8
are not subject to correction by the U.S. Supreme Court, that is a
matter of federalism's genius rather than "a way to avoid" U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent.
Another way that Justice Castille utilized Edmunds to limit the
independence of state constitutional decision-making was in requir-
ing a robust Edmunds analysis to maintain a line of state court
precedent when federal law in an area of parallel rights changed.
It sometimes happens that state court decisions that might origi-
nally have been based on federal sources, come, over time, to protect
rights to a greater extent than does federal law.8 1
That had happened in Commonwealth v. Matos8 2 in 1996. In Ma-
tos, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court conducted an Ed-
munds analysis in rejecting the rule of California v. Hodari D.,8 3
which held, under the Fourth Amendment, that discarded drugs
were not obtained as the result of an illegal seizure when the drugs
were discarded before the suspect had actually been restrained. In
rejecting the federal rule, Justice Cappy's majority opinion relied
heavily upon "clear precedent in Pennsylvania" that defined a sei-
zure more narrowly than did the Fourth Amendment.8 4 Under that
definition of seizure, the suspects in Matos had been illegally seized
at the time they discarded their drugs and the evidence was thus
properly suppressed under article I, section 8.
80. Id. at 304-05 (Castille, J., dissenting).
81. See generally Bruce Ledewitz, When Federal Law is Also State Law: The Implications
for State Constitutional Law Methodology of Footnote Seven in Commonwealth v. Matos, 72
TEMPLE L. REV. 561 (1999).
82. 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996).
83. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
84. Matos, 672 A.2d at 774.
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The problem for this analysis was that this "clear precedent in
Pennsylvania" had been premised on prior Federal Fourth Amend-
ment law that Hodari D. obviously rendered obsolete. Justice
Cappy remedied the lack of state constitutional precedent by retro-
actively re-conceptualizing this state precedent as state constitu-
tional holdings:
We do not find that because these cases were decided to some
degree by reliance upon the federal Fourth Amendment that
they are not representative of the law of this Commonwealth
pertaining to [a]rticle I, [s]ection 8. At best, nothing can be
discerned from the Court's failure to note specifically that
Pennsylvania Constitutional rights were also being considered.
The federal Constitution provides a minimum of rights below
which the states cannot go. Where our Court ... finds that the
police violated the defendant's federal constitutional rights,
there is no reason for the Court to go further and address what
additional protections the Pennsylvania Constitution might
also provide.8 5
The same issue of the status of state precedent originally prem-
ised on federal law arose in 2003, in Commonwealth v. Hall.8 6 But
this time, Justice Castille, who had filed the lone dissent in Matos,
wrote a majority opinion rejecting the Matos approach without
mentioning it.
The topic in Hall was the constitutionality of a jury charge that
the jury could infer intent to commit aggravated assault from the
use of an unlicensed firearm. The defendant argued that this in-
struction violated due process under both the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions.
Both sides framed the due process inquiry as concerning whether
the instruction comported with the standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The defendant acknowledged that that the U.S. Su-
preme Court had held in Ulster County v. Allen8 7 that a permissive
inference must satisfy the reasonable doubt standard "in the con-
text of the overall evidence. 88 But the defendant relied on three
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions predating Ulster County
that required an inference to "withstand reasonable doubt scrutiny
on its own. '8 9
85. Id. at 769 n.7.
86. 830 A.2d 537 (Pa. 2003).
87. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).




This context replicated the Matos issue of the meaning of state
precedent in a context of changed federal law. Justice Castille con-
cluded, "the stricter due process test" of the earlier case law had not
been "premised upon [a]rticle I, [s]ection 9 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution."90  But instead of holding that the earlier precedent
should be re-conceptualized as the current standard of the State
Constitution, as the Matos decision had done, Justice Castille con-
cluded that past state precedent premised on federal law was irrel-
evant to a current state constitutional analysis, which required an
Edmunds analysis as if the prior case law had never existed:
Of course, the fact that DiFrancesco neither explicitly nor im-
plicitly rendered a state constitutional holding does not fore-
close the possibility that a stricter due process standard could
be held applicable under [a]rticle I, [s]ection 9 in a case where
the issue is squarely presented. In this case, however, it is no-
table that appellant's brief, which is quite capably argued, does
not suggest that the text or history of [a]rticle I, [s]ection 9, or
concerns of policy, recommend or require the DiFrancesco
standard as a matter of Pennsylvania constitutional law. The
mere fact that this Court predicted in DiFrancesco that federal
law might evolve differently than it ultimately did does not re-
quire divergence from the federal standard. Moreover, in other
instances, this Court has declined to afford greater due process
protections under our state charter. 91
Justice Castille pressed his view of the proper role of Edmunds
in a series of constitutional criminal procedure cases. In 2002, in a
concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Perry,92 Justice Castille
argued that Pennsylvania should follow the Fourth Amendment's
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, 93 a view that
would ultimately gain majority endorsement in Commonwealth v.
Gary94 in 2014. In 2007, in Commonwealth v. Russo, Justice Cas-
tille's majority opinion not only adopted the federal open fields doc-
trine, under article I, section 8, but formally endorsed the Chief Jus-
tice's long-held view that the fourth Edmunds factor-policy con-
siderations-should be limited to "public policy considerations
unique to Pennsylvania. ''95 Justice Castille reiterated in Russo that
90. Id. at 548.
91. Id. at 548-49.
92. 798 A.2d 697 (Pa. 2002).
93. Id. at 706 (Castille, J., concurring).
94. 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014).
95. 934 A.2d 1199, 1212 (Pa. 2007).
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to allow state supreme court justices simply to disagree with exist-
ing federal constitutional jurisprudence in interpreting parallel
state constitutional provisions "could metamorphose into cover for
a transient majority's implementation of its own personal value sys-
tem as if it were an organic command. '96
While it was Justice Seamus McCaffery, rather than Chief Jus-
tice Castille, who wrote the actual opinion in Gary relinquishing
Pennsylvania's rejection of the federal automobile exception, it was
the jurisprudence of the Chief Justice, over a period of years, that
was manifest in the opinion. The Gary majority opinion, which the
Chief Justice joined, demonstrated in its conclusion that the court
had come full circle since Edmunds and that a presumption of fol-
lowing federal precedent in parallel provisions would be followed
thereafter. Justice McCaffery adopted the standard announced in
Gray in 1985 that there should be a compelling reason before the
Pennsylvania Constitution is interpreted to provide greater protec-
tion than does the U.S. Constitution, a standard that Edmunds had
displaced. Justice McCaffery concluded, "[o]ur review reveals no
compelling reason to interpret [a]rticle I, [s]ection 8 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution as providing greater protection with regard to
warrantless searches of motor vehicles than does the Fourth
Amendment." 97 And in words strikingly similar to those of Justice
Hutchinson's dissent in Sell, the majority expressed support for the
maintenance of "a single, uniform standard for a warrantless
search of a motor vehicle, applicable in federal and state court, to
avoid unnecessary confusion, conflict, and inconsistency in this of-
ten-litigated area. '98
Partly as a result of Chief Justice Castille's jurisprudence, the
outcome of the application of the Edmunds analysis in recent years
has usually been to follow the federal standard. Thus, parallel pro-
visions under the Pennsylvania Constitution may now be presumed
to follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This is the case whether
the analysis is done by Justice Castille himself, as in Common-
wealth v. Sam99 in 2008 or is done by other Justices as in, for exam-
ple, Commonwealth v. Batts, by Justice Saylor in 2013.100 The re-
sults in Superior Court have been similar.101
96. Id.
97. Gary, 91 A.3d at 138.
98. Id.
99. 952 A.2d 565, 585-89 (Pa. 2008).
100. 66 A.3d 286, 297-299 (Pa. 2013).
101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wade, 33 A.3d 108, 118-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Com-
monwealth v. Basking, 970 A.2d 1181, 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
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This growing restrictiveness is plainly the main story that can be
told about the influence of Chief Justice Castille on the interpreta-
tion of parallel provisions in the Pennsylvania Constitution pursu-
ant to the Edmunds test. However, it should be noted that most of
the above precedents have interpreted article I, section 8, rather
than other provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, even
though that fact was not discussed in the jurisprudential develop-
ment. The Chief Justice's approach in the context of other consti-
tutional provisions has been somewhat different.
In 2002, at about the same time that Justice Castille was launch-
ing his campaign to reform Edmunds analysis, he also wrote the
majority opinion that greatly expanded the independent reach of
free expression under article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. That case was Pap's A.M.v. City of Erie (Pap's A.M. 1),102
in which the operator of an establishment featuring nude erotic
dancing challenged an Erie city ordinance prohibiting public nu-
dity.
Pap's A.M. II was decided on remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court.10 3 In the first round in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Pap's A.M. , a majority had decided that the ban on nude dancing
in an Erie city ordinance violated free speech under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 10 4 In Pap's A.M. I, Justice
Castille concurred in the result, arguing that the Erie ordinance did
not violate the First Amendment under existing U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, but should be held to violate article I, section 7 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 5 The U.S. Supreme Court re-
viewed this decision and reversed on the First Amendment ground,
upholding the Erie ordinance. 106 The case was then remanded for
consideration of the state constitutional ground. 10 7
After the remand, in a majority opinion by Justice Castille, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny, rather than
any intermediate standard, should be applied in the case.108 Under
that standard, which was a clear departure from federal analysis,
the Erie ordinance was held unconstitutional as a violation of arti-
cle I, section 7.109 This was a clear instance of independent state
102. 812 A.2d 591 (Pa. 2002).
103. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
104. Pap's A.M.v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 280-81 (Pa. 1998).
105. Id. at 281.
106. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 277.
107. Id. at 283.
108. Pap's A.M. II., 812 A.2d at 602. The U.S. Supreme Court had applied the O'Brien
standard in upholding the ordinance. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 277.
109. Pap's A.M. II, 812 A.2d at 613.
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constitutional analysis departing from a federal standard. This re-
sult is in contrast to the attitude expressed in the article I, section
8 cases above, in which such departures were opposed by Justice
Castille.
In Pap's A.M. II, Justice Castille's majority opinion did in fact
conduct an Edmunds analysis. But his attitude toward Edmunds
was curiously muted and nothing like the enthusiastic tone that
Justice Castille invokes in applying Edmunds analysis in cases un-
der article I, section 8. All Justice Castille would say in the Pap's
A.M. II decision was "that it is helpful to conduct our Pennsylvania
constitutional analysis, to the extent possible, consistently with the
model suggested by Edmunds."110 In search cases, Justice Castille
would strongly suggest that an Edmunds analysis is mandatory in
interpretation of parallel provisions and that decisions that did not
engage a formal Edmunds analysis were not entitled to full prece-
dential weight."'
Not only was the invocation of Edmunds ambivalent in tone, but,
compared to the kind of standard for which Justice Castille would
later argue in Russo, there was little justification in Pap's A.M. II
for departing from the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that the Erie
ordinance was constitutional. The Edmunds analysis in Pap's A.M.
I1 was truncated-the third prong of holdings in other states was
dropped altogether-and the text and history treatment, including
the robust history of protection of free expression in Pennsylvania
precedent, the open-ended language in the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tional text and the nature of the state government versus that of
the limited powers of the federal government, should have all been
applicable under every article I, section 8 analysis as well. Even
the unsettled state of federal law, which had led the majority in
Pap's A.M. I to mistakenly conclude that the Erie ordinance was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, could not seriously
be relied upon as a justification for independent state constitutional
interpretations, since Justice Castille himself had no trouble pre-
dicting in Pap's A.M. I that the Erie ordinance was constitutional
under federal law.112
When reading Justice Castille's opinion in Pap's A.M. II, the im-
pression is very strong that the main reason that Justice Castille
110. Id. at 603.
111. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shaw, 770 A.2d 295, 305 (Pa. 2001) ("The inability to even
begin to defend a novel holding pursuant to Edmunds... raises a presumption that the state
constitutional holding is erroneous").
112. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 281 (Pa. 1998).
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did not follow the U.S. Supreme Court had nothing to do with issues
of interpretation per se. Instead, Justice Castille simply found fed-
eral law unpersuasive because it was insufficiently protective of
free expression. This is, of course, what one would want a state
supreme court justice to consider when interpreting a parallel state
constitutional provision. But, ironically, it is precisely this kind of
generalized reconsideration of federal precedent that Russo and fol-
lowing cases have tried to eliminate from Pennsylvania constitu-
tional analysis. In other words, Justice Castille did not follow the
U.S. Supreme Court in Pap's A.M. II for the simple reason that he
disagreed with it. And he did not consider his disagreement to be
idiosyncratic or novel.
Thus, Pap's A.M. II represents an alternative approach to consti-
tutional interpretation of parallel provisions from that of recent
cases decided pursuant to article I, section 8. Since Pap's A.M. II,
Chief Justice Castille continued to apply a higher level of review
under article I, section 7 than does the U.S. Supreme Court under
the First Amendment. He did this in joining a dissent by Justice
Saylor in 2006, In the Matter of Condemnation by Urban Redevel-
opment Authority of Pittsburgh113 and in a majority opinion in De-
Paul v. Commonwealth in 2009.114 In both these instances no for-
mal Edmunds analysis was done. 115
Another context that might indicate that Edmunds is not as all-
encompassing in Chief Justice Castille's jurisprudence as one might
infer is a case from 1999, Wertz v. Chapman Township.116 Wertz
involved article I, section 6, the civil jury trial provision. Since the
Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution is not applicable
to the states, the civil jury trial provision is not technically a paral-
lel provision. Nevertheless, given existing federal precedent, it is
significant that Edmunds was not even mentioned in a dissent in
Wertz by Justice Castille in which he argued that the majority had
interpreted section 6 too narrowly. 117
113. 913 A.2d 178, 189-94 (Pa. 2006) (Saylor, J. dissenting).
114. 969 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2009).
115. In DePaul, Chief Justice Castille canvassed a number of the Edmunds factors in ef-
fect, such as the treatment by other states of the issue in question, but expressly noted that
no formal Edmunds analysis was needed:
Given this Court's extensive consideration of [a]rticle I, [s]ection 7 under the Edmunds
factors in Pap's II, and the fact that the Commonwealth does not dispute that the ap-
propriate state constitutional test in this arena is strict scrutiny, there is no reason to
engage in a full-blown Edmunds analysis here.
Id. at 547.
116. 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999).
117. Id. at 1280-81 (Castille, J., dissenting).
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A related treatment of a federally influenced provision arose in
2006, in Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth.1 1 8
Justice Castille held for the court that the Act that mandated the
Turnpike Commission to engage in collective bargaining with first-
level supervisors, but did not require any other agency to do so with
regard to its first-level supervisors, is a special law in violation of
article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.11 9
There was not even a mention of Edmunds in Turnpike despite
the recognition that section 32 had been treated in the past as par-
allel to Federal Equal Protection: "The common constitutional prin-
ciple at the heart of the special legislation proscription and the
equal protection clause is that like persons in like circumstances
should be treated similarly by the sovereign."1 20
The ultimate holding in Turnpike was that the law reflected a
class of one and was thus unconstitutional. The class of one doc-
trine is unique to Pennsylvania and is in fact idiosyncratic and im-
practical. But for our purposes, the important thing is that even
where Justice Castille could have looked to Federal Equal Protec-
tion law for guidance, he did not feel the need to do so. The Act in
Turnpike would undoubtedly have survived under federal rational
basis review.
It is fair to conclude that the strong emphasis upon Edmunds
analysis, primarily in cases arising under article I, section 8, and
the strong tendency of the Chief Justice to promote consistency be-
tween federal and state constitutional outcomes, is only a part of
his jurisprudential legacy. If all of the aspects of the Chief Justice's
interpretations in the area of parallel rights are taken into account,
the matter of independent state constitutional interpretation looks
quite different and, in fact, may even have been enhanced by the
Chief Justice.1 21
118. 899 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 2006).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1094 (citing Kramer v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd., 883 A.2d 518, 532
(Pa. 2005); Probst v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 849 A.2d 1135, 1143 (Pa. 2004); Com-
monwealth v. Albert, 758 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Pa. 2000)).
121. I have not mentioned the procedural aspects of interpretation of parallel constitu-
tional provisions because Justice Castille did not emphasize issues of process. In general, if
there is a claim in a case under a parallel state constitutional provision, a state supreme
court should decide it whether there is also a federal issue in the case or not. Doing so pre-
vents unnecessary U.S. Supreme Court review of the federal claim. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court faced this context in Pap's A.M. , but chose to decide only the federal ground,
leaving the state ground to be decided only after reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Castille warned the majority to decide the state constitutional issue, but stopped
short of putting the matter in methodological terms. He simply warned the majority that
they were mistaken in their First Amendment analysis.
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An even stronger indication of the willingness of the Chief Justice
to interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution independently, even
fearlessly, can be seen in his opinions in the field of non-parallel
rights. While not, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the cases
noted here that pushed for a presumption against independent
state court interpretation, they also do not suggest a jurist hesitant
to make a bold mark in a national debate.
III. INTERPRETATION OF NON-PARALLEL PROVISIONS
Chief Justice Castille will be long-remembered for four decisions
he authored as Chief Justice interpreting provisions of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution that do not have counterparts in the U.S. Con-
stitution. It is not my purpose here to discuss these opinions in
depth; other contributors to this issue of the Duquesne Law Review
will do that for one or more of them. Rather, my goal is to show that
these decisions were rendered against a background of related U.S.
Supreme Court decision-making that Chief Justice Castille ignored.
Thus, even here, in an area in which federal influence is usually
reduced, the tendency of the Chief Justice toward independent state
constitutional development was very pronounced.
These four cases concerned uniformity of taxations in 2009,122
voting rights, 123 reapportionment 124 in 2012, and the environment
in 2013.125 In three of the four instances, there existed federal prec-
edents that could have pointed the court in a different direction.
Chief Justice Castille chose instead a Pennsylvania-only approach.
In Clifton v. Allegheny County, the Chief Justice's majority opin-
ion 126 held the Allegheny County's base year system for property
tax assessment, pursuant to which a property's assessed value for
tax purposes is based upon market value in a base year for an in-
definite period of time, violated the uniformity clause of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution as applied. 127 This holding was based upon
evidence in the case that there had been substantial changes in the
market value of property in Allegheny County, so that property
owners were paying different amounts of property tax on properties
with the same current market value. 128 But the Chief Justice also
122. Clifton v. Allegheny Cnty., 969 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2009).
123. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
124. Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 38 A.3d 711 (Pa. 2012).
125. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
126. Justice Max Baer filed a concurring opinion and did not join the majority opinion.
Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1231-35 (Baer, J., concurring).
127. See PA. CONST. art VIII, § 1 (providing, in part, that "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform.").
128. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1222.
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held that the base year method of property tax valuation does not
facially violate the uniformity clause. 129
The result of these holdings was that Allegheny County was or-
dered to conduct a reassessment, but other counties in Pennsylva-
nia that were also utilizing base year methods would not neces-
sarily be subject to immediate judicial reassessment orders. This
could have meant that there would be breathing room for legislative
action by the General Assembly to rationalize property tax assess-
ment in Pennsylvania. 130 Whatever might have been Chief Justice
Castille's hope in that regard, no such legislative action has yet
been forthcoming.
In terms of federal precedent, the U.S. Supreme Court did hold
in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission31 that a
county assessor's practice of reassessing property values based al-
most entirely on recent sales-a practice that had produced wide
discrepancies in property tax payments for properties with identical
current values-was a violation of Equal Protection. But the reason
for this holding was not the discrepancies themselves but the fact
that this administrative practice was found not to be rationally re-
lated to West Virginia's policy of uniform taxation.1 32 In contrast,
in Nordlinger v. Hahn,1 33 in 1992, the Court upheld California's ac-
quisition value property tax assessment approach despite differ-
ences in assessed values over time of properties with similar cur-
rent value. Pennsylvania is more like California in that the base
year system does not violate state statutory law. The Chief Justice
acknowledged the Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal case, but noted that:
Although the analysis under the federal Equal Protection
Clause and Pennsylvania's Uniformity Clause is largely coter-
minous, unlike Pennsylvania's uniformity requirement, "the
United States Constitution does not require equalization
across all potential sub-classifications of real property (for ex-
ample, residential versus commercial). '' 134
129. Id.
130. The Chief Justice noted in his opinion that "Pennsylvania is the only state where
legislation allows the use of a base year indefinitely." Id. at 1231.
131. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
132. Id. at 343.
133. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
134. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1212. Federal precedent did play a role in the Chief Justice's
analysis in determining whether to treat the challenge to the assessment scheme in Clifton
as a facial or an as applied attack. The Chief Justice noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had yet to "consider thoroughly the standard by which facial challenges are evalu-
ated... " but that the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (1987), was "informative." Id. at 1223. It does not appear
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The two voting rights cases, Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportion-
ment Commission135 andApplewhite v. Commission,1 36 offer an even
stronger contrast with federal voting rights precedent. Holt, in
which the Chief Justice's majority opinion overturned the Legisla-
tive Reapportionment plan, contained a very nuanced balance of
federal and state constitutional principles in terms of legislative re-
apportionment.1 37 The Chief Justice noted that while Federal
Equal Protection requires substantial population equivalence in
any redistricting plan, federal law also allows "breathing space" for
state constitutional concerns of "contiguity, compactness and the
integrity of political subdivisions."1 38 Earlier Pennsylvania prece-
dent misperceived the future development of federal law in this
field, which "evolved to permit more flexibility in population devia-
tion" than the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had anticipated.1 39
Thus, the Chief Justice encouraged recognition of, but not subser-
vience to, federal constitutional requirements in a dynamic and
flexible system.
Chief Justice Castille's opinion in Holt did not even mention U.S.
Supreme Court case law that has rendered challenges to partisan
gerrymandering practically nonjusticiable.1 40 In contrast to that
case law, which has struggled to articulate any standard by which
partisan political abuse could be identified, 141 the majority opinion
in Holt straightforwardly recognized the political nature of redis-
tricting and promised that abuses would be dealt with:
It is true, of course, that redistricting has an inevitably legis-
lative, and therefore an inevitably political, element; but, the
constitutional commands and restrictions on the process exist
precisely as a brake on the most overt of potential excesses and
abuse. Moreover, the restrictions recognize that communities
indeed have shared interests for which they can more effec-
tively advocate when they can act as a united body and when
that the Chief Justice resolved the issue generally, but did hold that even under a lenient
standard, the facial challenge failed.
135. 38 A.3d 711 (Pa. 2012).
136. 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
137. Holt, 38 A.3d at 711.
138. Clifton, 38 A.3d at 759.
139. Id. at 760.
140. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
141. See, e.g., Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Vieth: "we have no standard by which to
measure" political gerrymander claims but such a standard may emerge in the future. Id. at
313 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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they have representatives who are responsive to those inter-
ests.
142
The independence of state constitutional interpretation from fed-
eral influence was even more pronounced in Applewhite1 43 because
in that case, the U.S. Supreme Court had earlier faced the same
issue of the constitutionality of state voter ID legislation. In Craw-
ford v. Marion County Election Board,144 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld Indiana's voter ID legislation. There was no
majority opinion. In the opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court, Justice Stevens argued that even apparently slight burdens
on the right to vote must be justified "by relevant and legitimate
state interests,'1 45 but that if such interests were shown, "those jus-
tifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan inter-
ests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual
legislators."1 46 Thus, at least in theory, Justice Stevens was pre-
pared to uphold an unnecessary law that one political party hoped
would disenfranchise opposition voters as long as the form of the
law was one that might have been passed without such improper
motivation. As far as the small number of voters who might actu-
ally be disenfranchised because they could not readily obtain the
necessary voter ID, Justice Stevens held out scant hope:
Petitioners ask this Court, in effect, to perform a unique bal-
ancing analysis that looks specifically at a small number of vot-
ers who may experience a special burden under the statute and
weighs their burdens against the State's broad interests in pro-
tecting election integrity. Petitioners urge us to ask whether
the State's interests justify the burden imposed on voters who
cannot afford or obtain a birth certificate and who must make
a second trip to the circuit court clerk's office after voting. But
on the basis of the evidence in the record it is not possible to
quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow
class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them
that is fully justified.147
For his part, Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment
did not believe that such a showing, even if it could be made, was
142. 38 A.3d at 745.
143. 54 A.3d at 1.
144. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
145. Id. at 191.
146. Id. at 204.
147. Id. at 200.
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relevant: "The Indiana photo-identification law is a generally appli-
cable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation, and our precedents re-
fute the view that individual impacts are relevant to determining
the severity of the burden it imposes. '148
In stark contrast, Chief Justice Castille's opinion in Applewhite
placed the burden squarely on the government to show that no sub-
stantial disenfranchisement from the voter ID requirement would
take place or an injunction against the law should issue. 149 It is
certainly the case that the confused statutory background influ-
enced the response of the Chief Justice, and the procedural context
of the case concerning the issuance of a preliminary injunction un-
doubtedly also played a role. Nevertheless, the contrast of the con-
cern of the Chief Justice with vulnerable populations disadvan-
taged by the ID requirement certainly resounds compared to the
language above of Justice Scalia:
[I]t is readily understood that a minority of the population is
affected by the access issue. Nevertheless, there is little disa-
greement with Appellants' observation that the population in-
volved includes members of some of the most vulnerable seg-
ments of our society (the elderly, disabled members of our com-
munity, and the financially disadvantaged).150
The overall point for our purposes here is that the fundamental
right to vote under the Pennsylvania Constitution appears to be far
more robust than the right to vote under the Federal Constitution.
The final, and most recent, instance of independent interpreta-
tion of the Pennsylvania Constitution by the Chief Justice in an
area of non-parallel rights is his celebrated plurality opinion in Rob-
inson Township v. Commonwealth 51 that invalidated several pro-
visions of Act 13, which had substantially preempted local zoning
laws as applied to oil and gas exploration. What rendered the opin-
ion of the Chief Justice so extraordinary was not only that the opin-
ion constituted the first serious judicial attempt to enforce the
148. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
149. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012) (explaining that "if the Com-
monwealth Court is not still convinced in its predictive judgment that there will be no voter
disenfranchisement arising out of the Commonwealth's implementation of a voter identifica-
tion requirement for purposes of the upcoming election, that court is obliged to enter a pre-
liminary injunction.").
150. Id. at 4.
151. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
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broad language of article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, 152 but also that a judge would be willing to take a public
stand on the dangers of some of the new technologies of energy ex-
ploration, including fracking.
In terms of the theme of this article, Chief Justice Castille could
not really have followed federal law in Robinson Township, even
had he wished to do so. There is not much to go on in the U.S.
Constitution in terms of protecting the environment. 153 But, con-
sidering the vigor and passion of his opinion, it seems unlikely the
Chief Justice would have deferred to a less protective federal stand-
ard, even if a federal environmental right of some sort did exist.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly Chief Justice Castille has influenced many areas of
law during his tenure of over twenty years on the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. But it is hard to think of any Justice in the history of
Pennsylvania jurisprudence who has had more of an impact on the
development of the Pennsylvania Constitution. I hope this short
article has demonstrated that this influence cannot be easily sum-
marized in the usual American legal categories of conservative ver-
sus liberal, originalist versus the living Constitution, or strict con-
struction versus open-ended. Nor can anyone pigeonhole the Chief
Justice in terms of a model of interpretation, whether that model is
Justice Scalia or Ronald Dworkin. The Chief Justice obviously did
not approach his task in these ways.
What we are left with is a legacy of serious engagement with the
most important role of a state supreme court justice-the interpre-
tation and application of the fundamental law of the State. Politi-
cally speaking, sometimes the Chief Justice leaned right and some-
times left. Sometimes he brought about dramatic results and other
times deferred to co-equal branches. Sometimes he interpreted in-
dependently and other times followed a federal lead. But in all of
these turns, Chief Justice Castille blazed his own path, beholden to
no preordained ideology or result. I don't think any more than that
can be asked of any judge.
152. "The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the nat-
ural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the ben-
efit of all the people." PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
153. Efforts to conceptualize a federal constitutional right have not had any real impact,
including my own contribution. See Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional
Right to a Healthy Environment in US and Our Posterity, 68 Miss. L.J. 565, 614-15 (1998).
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